

Russian troops in Right-bank Ukraine and Russian-Japanese war (1904-1905)

The article is dedicated to influence of Russian-Japanese war in 1904-1905 on imperial troops on Right-bank Ukraine. It is shown on the basis of sources, that the war 1904-1905 led to the maximal use of all resources of mobilization of the Russian empire, that stipulated the necessity of aspiration on the theatre of operations of troops from western regions, including from Right-bank Ukraine. In particular, in 1905 the third rifle brigade, row of field engineer, line, medical and other subdivisions were directed to Manchuria . The operations of 3rd rifle brigade (in 1905-1906 – division) that played a noticeable role in Mukden fight is traced; in particular, displace attention on the episode of capture of brigade commander of major-general Sologum, that became the only general of the Manchurian army, who was taken in captivity to the Japanese troops.

The other important direction of bringing in of troops is also analysed, that was from the right bank of Ukraine to participating in a conflict is direction of separate subdivisions or servicemen the Far-Eastern army. In particular, the facts of ordering to front of subdivisions of 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 125th, 126th, 173th infantry regiments were succeeded to set, and also officers from most parts deployed in a region.

For the first time, the so-called partial mobilizations that were preferentially conducted in separate parts of empire are analyzed in home scientific literature. Motion of sixth and seventh mobilizations (took place in summer in 1905) during that in the separate districts of Right Bank called the warriors of supply of the most highly sought soldiery specialties (field engineers, signalers, doctors) is traced, partly mobilization spread also on spare lower ranks of infantry. Mobilization of horse composition, that overcame 22 from 36 districts of region, was in addition, conducted, and had an aim to provide the army in the field with a cart transport.

Keywords: *Right-bank Ukraine, Russian-Japanese war, 3rd rifle brigade, 8th partial mobilization.*

One of less explored aspects of history of the Russian military presence on territory of Right-bank Ukraine is bringing in of the soldiery parts deployed in a region, to participation in conflicts and as a participant of that came forward the Russian empire. Yes, in scientific literature the actions of troops are fluently reflected from Right Bank in the period of Russian-Turkish war in 1877-1878 and the First world war. At the same time unexplored are remained the questions of

bringing in of troops from a region to the conflicts on the Asian subcontinent, in particular, to Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905.

We should notice that quite a bit Russian military leaders which played a noticeable role in this war were one way or another the character related to Podilya. In particular, commandant Port-Arthur a lieutenant-general Stessel owned an estate near-by Hop-garden, where and conducted the last years of the life. Preamur governor general Khreschatytskyi, that did considerable payment in a defensive from Japaneses of Far East, in 1886-1893 gave orders to 2nd the Erected kosak division deployed in Kamianets-Podilskyi.

Also it should be noted that the population of Right-bank Ukraine actively became familiar to support the troops on Far East. It should be noted that in most provinces of the Russian empire organization of army help it was undertaken by the organs of territorial self-government, however on Right Bank territorial justices in 1904 just begun to create, that is why collection of money for help to the hospitals on the theatre of battle actions and war victims church structures engaged in parallel, nobiliary and municipal self-governments and others like that.

What touches influence of Russian-Japanese war on the troops deployed on Right Bank, then it should be noted that at once after the beginning of conflict his scales exceeded all previous prognoses of the Russian command considerably, therefore a question appeared about the necessity of strengthening of troops on Far East. This task decided by a few ways. Yes, the human capitals of Siberia and Far East were maximally widely used - from reserve parts opened out three Siberian infantry divisions, fully mobilized kosak Orenburg, Siberian, Transbaikalia, and Amur kosak troops; a certificate of sharp lack of human capitals is circumstance that to the militiaman wives attracted the persons deported on Far East for political crimes even [2, p.1600-1601].

At the same time the protracted prosecution of full-scale war was impossible without kicking about troops from Europe part of empire, that became complicated by a few factors. Firstly, the subzero carrying capacity of the Transsiberian highway did not allow quickly to kick about on Far East the far of troops, that did

inadvisable one-stage mass mobilization. Secondly, the difficult foreign-policy situation of the Russian empire (most large states occupied the side of Japan in a conflict) did not allow to kick about the far of parts of peace-time. Therefore military-political guidance of the Russian empire made decision about the selective ordering to the theatre of operations of soldiery parts with parallel realization of the so-called partial mobilizations, each of that embraced the separate districts of those or other territorial departments only.

It should be noted that at the beginning XX of century Right-bank Ukraine was one of regions of the Russian empire with the greatest concentration of troops - on counts S. Velychenko, after the part of soldiery in the total population of Right Bank yielded to only the Polish provinces (so-called Pryvyslyansky land) and Transcaucasia [3, p.87]. Therefore no wonder that carried out by a military department events in relation to strengthening of the Manchurian army directly touched the troops deployed in right-bank provinces.

By the first direction of bringing in of troops from Right-bank Ukraine to participation before war the direct overbanking of parts and connections became on Far East. A model stroke for description of strategic position of Right Bank is circumstance that during first-year of war from a region it was not sent on front of not a single part – the power gave advantage of sending the troops from more remote border walks of life of empire - Kharkiv Region, Volga and others like that. Only in December in 1904 on Far East was sent 3rd the rifle brigade deployed in Jmerinka of the Podolsk province (interestingly, that for connection this was the not first journey on Far East - in 1900-1901 a brigade was already sent to Manchuria for participating in suppression of the Chinese revolt). On December, 19 near-by Jmerinka emperor's review troops that left on Far East participated in that, took place: 3rd rifle brigade, 5th field engineer and 2nd East Siberian field engineer battalions and others like that [9, c.770]. After the ceremony of farewell and handing each of parts to the gift from tsar's family - icon of Saviour not of human making a size 4 on 3 creams (18 on a 13,5 cm) in a silver chasuble - a rifle brigade and other forming left on Far East.

The front fate of 3rd of rifle brigade can serve as the model example of problems that existed in the Russian army and directly affected negative for the Russian empire completion of war with Japan. A brigade arrives to Manchuria in the period of Mukdensk battle - most scale, protracted in time and bloody battle of Russian-Japanese war period. Bitter fights compelled the Russian command chaotically to give up arriving from Russian backlogs in a fight, dividing regular connections into impromptu detachments. Commander of 3rd rifle brigade a major-general Volodymyr Ustynovych Solohub led detachment in composition a 10th rifle regiment and 5th rifle regiment of 2nd rifle brigade a task to defend the village of Yuhuantun depended upon that, located nearby strategically important way. In sources it is possible to find diametrically opposite estimations in relation to events that took place with detachment of general Solohub, however the implicit is remained by a fact that detachment was broken and bore heavy human tolls. A commander of detachment was taken prisoner here, becoming the only general of the Manchurian army, that was captivated by Japanese (all in a period of war about ten Russian generals ended up in the Japanese captivity, however practically all of them were captive after the surrender of fortress Port-Arthur).

Publications in printing in relation to this fight contradict each other. A military journalist P. M. Krasnov (afterwards general from a cavalry, well-known figure of whiteguard motion) wrote so, for example,, that "disappearance of general Solohub is one of the striking episodes of Mukdensk fight. Seeing confusion in the detachment, he skipped away in a beam, where the frightened people crowded, and tried to show out them from there. From this moment him anymore nobody saw and the fate of him is unknown" [8, p. 1076]. Something later a well-known newspaper "New time" published the note of unknown author, according to that a general during February, 23-24 bravely removed the attacks of enemy at the head of the detachment, and during retreat was contused and lost consciousness; coming to the comprehension in abandoned fang (Chinese house) and not educing next to nobody of inferiors, made way to the Russian troops, Spain up and about and, eventually, the exhausted was trapped in a captivity by Japanese

soldiers. Author of note, specifying that general Solohub in any case can not be considered unexperienced or cowardly - he is an experienced veteran of Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, - set logical questions: "How could a general, chief of detachment, end up in stranger fang one, abandoned all? Really did nobody of other commanding persons try to save him, to take out battles" from the field? [6, p. 1241].

In fast time of 3th a rifle brigade registered nothing in battle actions. Largely it was explained by stopping of scale operations on completion of Mukdensk operation. Indeed, the process of increasing the counteractive armies proceeded here. Therefore on March, 12 by an order on a military department №1166 a mouth is announced forming of machine gun at the row of connections, in particular, at 3rd to the rifle brigade [10, p.1001]. In addition, rifle brigades that arrived in the complement of troops on Far East from European part of empire were unfolded in a division. The 3rd rifle brigade was unfolded in a division with maintenance previous to the number and former numeration of regiments (unfortunately, we did not succeed to set the number of corresponding emperor's decree and time of his signing). On June, 19 the commanders of brigades of the newly formed division were appointed the major-generals of Prosinsky and Pashkovskyi [16, p.1392]. It will be noticed that both they were experienced battle officers. Hilyariy - Ivan-Sigismund Stanislav Pashkovskyi was the participant of Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, during that for bravery he was the recipient of an award the order of saint Heorhij IV degree and by the rank of Lieutenant - captain "for services" in battle. In February in 1900 he became the commander of 12th rifle regiment of 3rd rifle brigade, at the head of that in the same year he participated in suppression of revolt of boxers in China. In 1904 at the head of the same regiment colonel Pashkovskyi again left on Far East, registered in fights, therefore got a reward - order of saint Volodymyr III degree and rank of major-general [18, p.1296]. Vaclav Lavrentii Prosinsky also was the participant of Russian-Turkish and Russian-Japanese wars, got a general's rank for services in battle [18, p.1276].

In August of 1905 3rd and 4th rifle and 2nd Kuban Plastun brigades were erected in 2 erected rifle corps (a commander – lieutenant-general Selivachov, a chief of staff is a general major Richter) [11, p.1443]. Interestingly, that an order about creation of corps conducts speech about brigades, although all for a few months of it development of rifle brigades took place in a division - it is possible to assume that in conditions of halt the battle actions of command made decision about a return to the team structure.

Except ordering to the theatre of battle actions of staffed parts of peace-time, bringing in of troops from Right-bank Ukraine to participating in war showed up also in ordering to Far East of personnel of parts that remained on the walks of life of edge. Unfortunately, in our order absent materials in relation to all parts deployed on Right Bank, however separate well-known examples allow to talk about the considerable scales of the phenomenon. Can exemplify deployed in Medzhybizh the 48th infantry Odesa regiment. Regimental history certifies a number of translations of warriors of regiment on Far East. In autumn in 1903 on forming the 8th company of the 27th East Siberian rifle regiment the 5 private first classes were distinguished, 24 combatant and 6 non-combatant lower ranks, 1 musician; as a company was formed in Proskuriv at the 46th infantry Dnepr regiment, it is possible assume that the same amount of warriors to her was sent from other regiments of 12th of infantry division. In 1904 on staffing of 124th infantry Voronezh regiment (a place of permanent distribution is Kharkiv) sent to Far East, the Odesa regiment distinguished the 6 non-commissioned officers and 62 ordinaries. On forming of 9-ї of the East Siberian rifle brigade a regiment distinguished 33 soldiers, on staffing 3th of field engineer brigade is the 1 private first class and 4 line ordinaries. 2 non-commissioned officers and 47 ordinaries translated to the company of the 45th Azov regiment, sent on the theatre of battle actions; to the company sent from the 47th infantry Ukrainian regiment, translated the 6 non-commissioned officers, 88 ordinaries and a 1 medical assistant [14, p.309-310].

From 48th infantry regiment during 1904 a 1 staff-officer and 14 ober-officers sent on Far East. In addition, a 1 staff-officer and 15 ober-officers were sent in reserve and spare parts [14, p.310].

Ordering to front of warriors of 48th infantry regiment is better in all represented in accessible to us sources. It is, however, possible to assume that in other parts a situation was alike. Yes, about ordering of troops to Far East historical sight of 173th infantry K-P regiment (a place of distribution is Tcherkasy) remembers fluently [1, c.37]. It is known about participating in war with Japan of three officers of the 74th infantry Stavropol regiment (a place of distribution is Kamenets-Podolskyi). It will be noticed that all three became well-known soldiery figures - Oleksandr Burkovsky was served until to the rank of general's general-lieutenant and position of commander of 1st of the machine Gun division of Army UPR [20, c.78], M. Timonov gave orders to the division in a kolchakovskyy army [4, 112], P. Razderyshyn afterwards became a colonel and headed the row of the regiments deployed on Right-bank Ukraine [19, c.706]. It is therefore possible to assume that war participants were more officers from this part, however their biographies need a further study.

By the third direction of bringing in of soldiery structures on Right Bank to participating realization of mobilizational work became in war. As already marked higher, Russian military-political guidance gave up realization of mass mobilization, practicing but the so-called partial mobilizations for development to the states of war-time of parts that left on Far East, and for sending of march additions. On Right-bank Ukraine similar mobilizational events were first conducted only within the framework of eighth partial mobilization.

In May, 12, 1905 a governor sent a secret circular in relation to realization of eighth partial mobilization. It will marked that the substantive provisions of this document practically fully repeat the "review" of staff of the Kyiv territorial department from September, 27 in 1904 №300/1087 and circular of governor №337 from September, 29 in 1904 [5, 1.108].

According to a circular the lower ranks of three senior years of service (1888-1890) of appeal were not subject. In districts, where mobilization was first conducted, except the draftees of soldiery specialities, it was envisaged to mobilize the railroaders of supply (except those, who continued to work on the ferrous road and not subject to the appeal), and also quartermaster's janitors.

Specially attention applied on the problem of drunkenness among the mobilized warriors of supply. Will notice that the scale problem of drunkenness and offences during realization of appeal or mobilization to tsar's army is lighted enough up in scientific literature [7]. In the circular of governor specified, that during realization of previous partial mobilization there "were cases of secret sale of vodka. Opening of grog-shops is earlier sending of the last column" [5, l. 109].

It was envisaged that the spare must arrive to the district center by whole volosts, escorted by rural heads, volost petty officers and clerks, policeman of officers; arrival one by one was forbidden, in order to avoid ill-timed arrival (it follows to take into account that cases took place, when people, that mobilizations were subject, arrived to district of presence behind time, when the necessary amount of warriors was already selected) [5, apк.109].

During eighth partial mobilization of appeal subject: in Letichiv district is an army infantry, medical, company and veterinary medical assistants non-combatant, field engineers and telegraphers, in all 1652 persons; in Nova Ushytsja district – army infantry, non-combatant, master, field engineers, telegraphers, pedestrian artillery, all categories of medical assistants, in all 2099 persons; in Proskuriv district is an army infantry, medical assistants, hospital attendants non-combatant, specialists, field engineers, telegraphers, bakers, in all 1991 people; in Balta district is the field engineers and telegraphers, in all 81 people; Bratslav district is the field engineers and medical assistants, in all 23 persons; in Hajsyn district is the field engineers, telegraphers, medical assistants, in all 59 people; in Lityn district is 6 telegraphers; in Mohyliv district – 15 medical and company medical assistants; in Olhopil district is the field engineers and medical assistants, in all 24 people; in

Yampil district is the field engineers, medical and company medical assistants, on the whole 67 persons [5, 1.111].

In June, 10, 1905 emperor Mykola II signed a decree according to that it followed to "call on actual service in obedience to the special on this case partial changes of the operating mobilizational painting" of lower ranks of supply from the row of localities of empire, including from two districts of Kyiv, seven districts of Volyn and three districts of Podolsk provinces. In addition, must be called separate categories of servicemen from six districts of Kyivshchyna, seven districts of Podolya. Except mobilization of warriors, from the Tcherkasy and Zhytomyr districts the horse had to be within the limits of military-equestrian duty [5, 1.112].

In June, 22, 1905 from K-P reported that mobilization is in Proskuriv, Ushytsya and Letychiv districts passed calmly, there were not public nuisances [5, 1.124]. It is possible to establish, that the representatives of military administration in the Right-bank region took into account errors sufferet during previous partial mobilizations, that allowed to conduct mobilizational events quickly and effectively.

In obedience to a decree from August, the horse had to be from Berdychiv and Lypovec district of Kyiv province, Ostrog, Novograd-Volyn and Zaslav districts of Volyn province, Yampil, Mohyliv and Haysin of districts of Podolsk province [17, p.1491].

On the whole it is possible to establish, that maximal tension of human and material forces of the Russian empire in war with Japan could not touch the military groupment concentrated on Right-bank Ukraine - one of most saturated by forming of imperial army of regions of empire. Bringing in to participating in a conflict took place in three basic forms. First of all, from Right-bank on Far East the row of parts and connections of army of peace-time was sent, in particular, 3rd rifle brigade, 21st field engineer battalion, row of hospitals. Also there was sending soldier and officers from other parts – 48th infantry Odesa regiment deployed in a region, 173rd infantry Kamyanets regiment and others like that. Finally, soldiery

parts and institutes were brought over to realization of mobilization of the personal and horse composition, transporting of troops to Manchuria and others like that.

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